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I. INTRODUCTION
It is well recognized in economics today that a great deal of
behavior is motivated by a desire to signal the possession of valued
(or, occasionally, feared) traits. The literature considers signaling
behavior by business firms in market settings and by individuals in
personal, nonmarket settings such as courtship and friendship but it
does not consider signaling behavior by individuals in market settings
and it is that gap that we hope in this paper to fill. It is a large gap.
Labor and consumer markets are an important part of the economy,
and signaling by workers and consumers is an important and
neglected feature of these markets. Certain types of market behaviors
by individuals—such as selling consumer goods or performing work
at a “low” wage—are avoided because of the undesirable signals that
such behavior conveys. Others are undertaken (in part anyway) to
signal desirable traits, for example offering to work at a job that is
compensated mainly by bonus or commission rather than straight
salary; but we do not discuss these specific examples.
 The idea for this paper arose out of our dissatisfaction with
some of the claims of “behavioral economics” (see R. Posner
(1998)1) conjoined with our research on status signaling (Fremling
                                    
* Fremling has a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at Los
Angeles. Posner is chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit and a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. The
authors thank Gary Becker, John Lott, Ignacio Palacio-Huerta, Eric Posner,
Eric Rasmusen, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler for their very helpful
comments on a previous draft, and participants in the University of Chicago’s
Workshop in Rational Models in the Social Sciences, where an earlier version
of the paper was given on October 12, 1999, for their very helpful comments.
The authors welcome further comments; their email addresses are
GFremling@aol.com, and richard_posner@ca7.uscourts.gov, respectively.
1 The qualification in “some” should be emphasized. There is no doubt of the
utility of a number of the concepts of behavioral economics, and of cognitive
psychology more generally. See, for example, R. Posner (1999).
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and R. Posner (1999)). We argue in Part VII of the present paper
that several of the major puzzles of rationality identified by
behavioral economists (as in Thaler (1980), (1991), Rabin (1998),
and Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler (1998)) may be dispelled when
situated within a framework that considers future opportunities for
social or economic interaction and so the incentive for signaling
behavior. An individual will often forgo small immediate economic
gains to protect or enhance his future opportunities. The perfectly
rational motive to portray oneself as an economically well-off, caring
person can have a multitude of interesting consequences for market
behavior. We also suggest a possible way of determining whether the
behavioral model or a signaling model provides more accurate
predictions.
Just as business firms have incentives to send the right signals to
potential business partners, employees, customers, and competitors,
as by emphasizing the signaler’s high-quality work, reliability,
trustworthiness, altruism—or for that matter his competitive
ferocity, as in the literature on predatory pricing (see, e.g., Lott
(1999))—so individuals have incentives to signal selected traits to the
people with whom they have or seek to have interactions.
Behavioralists, as well as other social scientists, and moral
philosophers, place great weight on fairness, altruism in a
nonutilitarian sense (that is, acting out of duty rather than because
of interdependent utility functions), guilt as a motivator, and other
values conceived to be noninstrumental. We, in contrast, treat
signaling as a self-interested phenomenon. The characteristics
signaled need not be, and often are not, self-interested ones; but the
only incentive to signal them, that is, to communicate them to other
people in a credible form (usually involving some cost), is to gain
some advantage in transactions, broadly interpreted to embrace
nonpecuniary social interactions as well as “economic” transactions
in a narrow sense.2 This is not to suggest that there is anything
wrong with signaling, although it is important to note that rational
signaling need only be credible and thus need not convey true
information; there is room for deception. We take up these issues
                                    
2 This is a bit overstated. For example, one might give nonanonymously to a
charity not to get “credit” for being altruistic, but to encourage giving by others
who might repose trust in one’s judgment.
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later. Our only point here is that we view signaling as motivated by a
rational desire to improve the signaler’s future interactions, whether
social or business.
There are two important differences between our approach and
that of the existing literature on signaling. The first is that the
existing literature on signaling behavior by individuals is focused on
noncommercial transacting, including the marriage and friendship
“markets.” Second, the signals that are studied in this literature are
not market signals, that is, forms of buying or selling, but involve
consumption or gift-giving. The signaling of status through
conspicuous consumption was made a well-known concept by
Veblen (1899), has been studied by anthropologists extensively, and
within economics has been revived recently as a subject of inquiry,
notably by Robert Frank (1985), (1999). Inconspicuous
consumption can have a signaling dimension too, as where
individuals who seek or occupy positions of trust use diet or exercise
to keep thin in order to signal a low discount rate, which makes
them more trustworthy. (In earlier times, when thinness was a
signal of malnutrition or tuberculosis, people may have eaten more
than they really wanted in order to signal health and prosperity.)
Gift-giving, also extensively studied by anthropologists, and
lately by sociologists and economists as well, provides good examples
of personal signaling. Camerer (1988), for example, shows that
seemingly wasteful gifts can signal the donor’s interest in entering
into a serious relationship. A survey conducted by Solnick and
Hemenway (1996) found that the two top reasons for liking a gift
were that it “showed a lot of thought” and that it “was something
that you wanted but felt you should not spend money on for
yourself.” The first reason is straightforward—the gift signaled that
the donor cared enough about the donee to make a real effort to find
the right gift—but the second reason is puzzling; why would one
feel complimented to receive a gift that one would not want to buy
oneself? The answer may be that  the recipient can enjoy it without
thereby indicating a taste for luxury (possibly implying softness or
selfishness), as he would be doing if he bought it himself.
The signaling function of gift giving and of conspicuous
consumption is well understood, but signaling by individuals of
personal characteristics (such as affluence or generosity) by means of
market activities (buying and selling, including the renting of one’s
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labor) has rarely been discussed in the scholarly literature. An
exception is Eric Posner, who argues (E. Posner (1997), p. 583):
To say that gift-giving is a useful mechanism for people who
want to behave altruistically, enhance their status, or pursue trust
relationships is not to say that such people can only use gift-
giving to achieve these goals and cannot achieve the same goals
by engaging in ordinary commercial transactions. As a matter of
theory, people can; as a matter of practice, they usually do not,
simply because gift-giving is the more effective mechanism.
He shows that a gift can generally give a stronger signal for a given
amount of money expended, whereas signaling by means of a market
transaction can be “fuzzy.” The examples he gives are convincing but
he does not discuss the question whether there are also cases in
which a market transaction may be an even better signaling
mechanism. Consider his example of a store whose employees have
some discretion in the amount of services rendered the customer, or
in the price of the good. Should a customer who wants to befriend
the employee, whether in order to get better service or prices in the
future or for some personal reason (maybe he would like to date the
employee), purchase an extra amount of goods from the employee or
give her a gift? A cash gift, as Eric Posner points out, transfers the
full amount of resources to the employee; to achieve the same
transfer to the employee through extra purchases would require
buying more than the customer wanted because the employee would
receive only a share (if that) of the profit on those sales.
Another point should be noted, however: if the customer has
already decided to purchase the good, then by selecting this store
over other stores or by approaching the particular salesperson he
would be bestowing benefits on her at little extra cost over the
lowest price of the good—less extra cost than if he bought a gift for
her. But if the “gift” is costless, or very cheap, to the giver, its efficacy
in signaling a desire to befriend is diminished. And it will usually be
difficult to make a credible claim to have incurred a big expense to
shop at this store rather than another, unless, perhaps, one lives at a
great distance, or ostentatiously waits around for a long time while
the favored salesperson is waiting on another customer, even though
other salespersons are obviously free.
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Although this problem is avoided with outright gifts, another
problem is created: in a business setting they usually are more visible
to third parties and therefore potentially more suspicious than
commercial transactions. Gifts can be a form of commercial bribe
designed to induce the employee to be disloyal to his principal.
Disguising the “gift” as a commercial transaction can make the
interpretation more ambiguous, and also more acceptable to the
employer because he gets his “cut” (the profit on the sale).
Concealing a cash gift by making it in secret, off premises, would be
an alternative, but the very effort at concealment would mark it as
illicit and thus place both the donor and the recipient in legal
jeopardy. People may decide, therefore, to use the market to
communicate intentions, dispositions, and so forth—in short, to
convey signals. The signal we are focusing on in this paper is not the
one sent by possessing or consuming a particular good, but the one
sent by the process by which the good is purchased or sold.
Ownership of a painting by an “Old Master” can signal wealth, but
so can the behavior of the owner at the auction at which he acquired
it.
II. WHICH MARKETS?
Markets are not all alike in terms of signaling opportunities for
the individuals participating in them. Some markets are anonymous,
such as stock markets; there is little room for signaling personal
characteristics through buying or selling if one is invisible to the
other party to the transaction. At the other extreme, some markets
involve two individuals dealing directly with each other; the market
in babysitting is an example. Markets also differ with respect to
whether the signals conveyed by market activity convey information
about the sender or about the sender’s beliefs concerning the
recipient, or both, as is often the case with gifts as well.
In a typical retail outlet, the consumer is limited to selecting
goods at already determined prices, leaving no room for individual
negotiation. In such a setting the consumer is limited in his market
signaling behavior to the selection of the outlet and of the specific
goods sold by it, and to some extent to the timing of purchases, like
whether to wait for a discount sale. These choices reflect the
consumer’s characteristics rather than his or her belief about the
personal characteristics of any salesperson. But if a salesperson steered
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a customer away from a particular product on the ground that “you
would find it too expensive,” this would convey a negative evaluation
of the customer; the salesperson had “sized him up” and decided he
was not affluent.
Similarly, suppose you’re invited to a restaurant, and the items
listed on the menu vary considerably in expensiveness. Take first the
case in which it is expected that you and your host will each pay for
his own meal. You’ll be apt to choose an item in the approximate
middle of the range. For if you choose a very expensive item, this
may be taken as a signal that your host has chosen a “cheap”
restaurant, while if you choose a very cheap item, this may be taken
as a signal that you can’t really afford a restaurant of this caliber. In
the case in which the host is paying for both meals, again you’ll be
apt to choose an item in the approximate middle of the range. If you
choose a very expensive item, this may signal greed, since you’re not
paying; if you choose a very cheap item, this may be taken as a signal
that you think your host is not sufficiently affluent to be able to
afford to buy you anything more than a cheap meal.
Markets also differ according to whether there is a third party
audience to the market transaction, and if so whether the market
participants care about the inferences drawn by the third parties.
Attending a public auction in a small town (or shopping in a small
town in a store where one is constantly bumping into one’s
neighbors and friends, who observe one’s purchasing in the store)
involves more signaling to third parties than participating in a similar
auction on the internet. Whether to actively seek out or avoid
opportunities for market signaling depends on whether it is
important for one to obtain favorable opportunities for future
business dealings; but it depends as well on the person’s taste and
competence. Individuals who are not gregarious by nature or who
lack social skills worry about acting foolishly or offending people if
they engage in market activities in the presence of other people
beyond what is unavoidable, and so they may avoid such situations.
The amount and nature of market signaling are sometimes
restricted by law, in particular antidiscrimination law. Not being
allowed to discriminate on the basis of race, sex, age, religion, or
disability impedes a firm in signaling a negative attitude against
certain groups but by the same token also makes it difficult to signal
positive attitudes. If a woman is hired into a high position, this may
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be because the firm is under legal or political pressure to favor
women rather than because it has a genuinely high regard for the
ability of the individual woman or of women in general.
III. SIGNALING INELASTIC DEMAND,
RISK TAKING, AND HIGH TRANSACTION COSTS
Efforts at market signaling generally focus on trying to
communicate ability, wealth, and altruism, since these are especially
important characteristics for cultivating advantageous business or
personal relations. Altruism is worthwhile to signal because
somebody with great wealth or abilities might not be a person worth
knowing—think of Dickens’s Scrooge. Wealth is worthwhile to
signal because, among other reasons, an altruistic person who has no
money may not be worth knowing either. Hence the signaling of
more than one characteristic, and in particular wealth or ability plus
altruism, normally is more valuable than signaling just one. Granted
there is a puzzle about why it is necessary to signal wealth indirectly;
one could have one’s wealth audited by a reputable accounting firm
and post the results on one’s Web site for all the world to see. We do
not have a complete solution to the puzzle, but we point out that it
is common for people to flaunt their wealth while at the same time
being reticent about details. In other words, people want to send a
“fuzzy” signal of wealth; this may be connected with fear of tax
audits, theft, kidnapping, and revealing information to competitors
that might be used against one.  
Merely announcing one’s possession of desirable qualities,
however, is likely to lack credibility; it is “cheap talk.” Such talk is
nevertheless very common and not entirely lacking in credibility, its
credibility being inverse to the incentive to lie.3 Verbal reassurances
of love, friendship and trust are so easy to make that a person who
does not engage in a lot of cheap talk may be suspect. This is
especially likely because most people believe they have at least some
ability to detect insincerity in the statements of other people, and so
a refusal to lavish praise and engage in the other common forms of
cheap talk may be read as fear of being unmasked as insincere.
                                    
3 For an excellent discussion of the economics of cheap talk, see Farrell and
Rabin (1996).
Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics 8
Talk ceases to be cheap when it is accompanied by the talker’s
“putting his money where his mouth is,” in the sense that if his talk
is insincere or misleading he will lose something of value to him.
Making talk costly may be essential to its credibility when the
incentive to mislead is great. Market behavior can be a method of
making talk costly, as we shall argue, but it is sometimes difficult to
interpret. If a person “overpays” when making a purchase, does this
mean that he is a wealthy altruist worth knowing, or that he has a
high cost of time that precludes him from bargaining or shopping
carefully, or that he is dumb or inexperienced? Similarly, the person
who always buys goods that have high price tags may be too busy to
shop and be relying on price as a proxy for quality, but then again he
may just be an inept consumer—or maybe he is flaunting his wealth,
which might be interpreted as a sign that he is a selfish, vulgar, or
boastful person.
High prices for services add additional complexities to the
analysis. In the case of fancy resorts, country clubs, and sometimes
even schools and neighborhoods, a high price can serve as a sorting
device, identifying people with similar tastes or who are otherwise
desirable to associate with. The alternative of sorting one’s
acquaintances on the basis of their apparent qualities, such as charm,
sophistication, and good manners, would allow good mimickers to
enter one’s circle of acquaintances but would exclude people who
were bad at presenting themselves, whereas sorting by the purse
strings allows into the circle some wealthy people who are not really
worth knowing and excludes some people who are worth knowing
but lack wealth. In other words, market signaling can be a device for
conveying information about personal characteristics that facilitates
sorting.
We shall focus on three particular types of market behavior that
can signal the possession of attributes such as wealth and ability that
are associated with high status in our society. They are inelastic
demand, high transaction costs, and risk taking. People who want
to signal that they have high status will have an incentive to
understate the elasticity of their demand for goods and services,
exaggerate their transaction costs as a function of the opportunity
cost of their time, and exaggerate their willingness to take financial
risks.
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We recognize—though for the sake of brevity we discuss the
point only in passing—that people sometimes have an incentive to
signal the opposite of the traits that we are emphasizing. For
example, one very successful trial lawyer in Chicago brags that he has
two sets of clothing, expensive and cheap, and that he wears the
cheap clothing when he is trying a case to a jury so that the jurors
will think that he is like them.4 Wealthy people sometimes drive
cheap cars, and otherwise live modestly, in order to reduce the
danger of robbery or kidnapping, or to avoid being pestered by
charity solicitors. The cost of these signals is positive, not negative as
it might seem, because the signaler is deviating from the
consumption pattern that he would choose were he not concerned
with conveying a signal. Some business people may cultivate (again
through decisions of what to purchase, and what not) a reputation
as a skinflint in order to increase the credibility of their low offers in
bargaining situations. In what follows, however, we discuss signals
designed to magnify the status or the apparent character of the
signaler.
Inelastic Demand. J. P. Morgan is said to have remarked of
someone who asked how much a yacht cost, “If you have to ask, you
can’t afford it.” In technical economic terms, he was suggesting that
a very wealthy person’s price elasticity of demand is zero within a
broad range. There is neither a theoretical nor, so far as we are
aware, an empirical basis for such a suggestion. Indeed, one can
easily imagine cases in which the wealthy person’s elasticity of
demand is higher than the poor person’s because the wealthy person,
being better educated, is a more savvy shopper, or because he can
stock up on discounted brands.5
                                    
4 Of course, if he wore expensive clothing, the jury might infer that he was a
very good lawyer. But a very good lawyer is not necessarily the kind of person
you trust—rather the opposite! This lawyer also eats in the cheap cafeteria in
the federal courthouse when he is conducting a jury trial, because the jurors eat
in the cafeteria and seeing him there will think he is like them and therefore
trustworthy (they can “read” him because he is like them). This incidentally is
an example of market signaling, whereas his choice of clothing is an example of
consumption signaling (inconspicuous consumption, in this case).
5 For empirical evidence, see Mulher, Williams, and Leone (1998), pp.
440–441.
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There are, however, three reasons for expecting the price
elasticity of demand to be lower across a large range of goods and
services for wealthier people than for poorer people, though of course
not zero. First, most wealthy people in our society have high labor
incomes and therefore high opportunity costs of time. The full price
of a good or service consists of its money price plus the time cost
involved in shopping for and consuming it. The larger the fraction
of the full price that consists of the time cost, the less responsive
demand will be to a change in the money price. Hence if wealthy
people have on average a higher opportunity cost of time than other
people, their price elasticity of demand for goods and services will be
lower than average. Although we emphasize high labor incomes, the
analysis may hold for the “idle rich,” who clip coupons rather than
working. They presumably attach a high value to their leisure
activities, and so time spent in shopping has a high opportunity cost
for them too.
Second, the price elasticity of demand for a good is likely to be
lower, the smaller the fraction of the buyer’s income is spent on that
good. Hence for goods such as food which form a smaller fraction of
the wealthy person’s purchases than of the poor person’s, we can
expect the price elasticity of demand to vary inversely with income.6
Third, wealthy people are likely to be more sensitive to subtle
variations in goods and services than the nonwealthy are. They are
likely, in other words, to be more “picky.” A difference that might
not strike the average buyer as important might be so important to
the wealthy buyer that he or she will insist on the particular good
even if a seemingly very close substitute is cheaper.
For all three reasons, a person who wants to give the impression
of being wealthy can be expected to avoid being seen taking time to
bargain over the price of goods or services that are not luxuries.
(Obviously even a very wealthy person will bargain over luxury items,
contrary to J. P. Morgan’s dictum.) This in turn implies reluctance
to trade nonluxury goods. If one has manifested a desire to possess a
certain coffee mug that is priced at $2, one will be reluctant to reveal
that one would sell it for $2.50, lest this be taken as a signal of
having a highly elastic demand for the good and thus of not being
                                    
6 For empirical evidence, see Appelbaum and Schettkat (1999), pp. 395–396.
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wealthy. (This analysis has implications, discussed in Part VII of this
paper, for the analysis of the endowment effect stressed by the
Behavioralists.) Or consider an auction with public bidding.
Signaling inelastic demand would imply that once you start bidding
you’ll be reluctant to stop, because stopping will reveal your sensitivity
to price, and so you’ll find yourself under pressure, for signaling
reasons, to go higher than you really want to bid.7 The risk of being
forced into making such a revelation may discourage would-be
signalers of wealth from participating in certain types of auction,
because the cost of signaling would be too high. Nonparticipation
need not signal lack of wealth, since it may mean nothing more
than that the nonparticipant is not interested in the items being
auctioned, or in auctions, period.
High Transaction Costs. “Not having time” for comparing
prices, traveling to far-away suppliers, cutting discount coupons, or
bagging one’s own groceries can signal wealth either because these
rather boring activities are inferior goods or (our point in the
previous section) because a person with a high income will have high
opportunity costs of time. But, equally, “not having time” can signal
high opportunity costs unrelated to wealth. Anyone who has a well-
paying job (but not so well paying as to make him one of the
wealthy) could end up poorer by spending time shopping for
bargains; his lost income could exceed his savings from paying lower
prices.8 And some people who have no money at all are simply very
busy (including graduate students and new parents). A nonwealthy
person may have high opportunity costs of time simply because he
loves sports or other leisure-time activities. The only thing that is
clear is that being seen engaged in comparison shopping, cutting out
discount coupons, standing in line, or engaging in like activities is
incompatible with signaling wealth. Hence—once again to
anticipate Part VII—we might expect the subjects of behavioralist
                                    
7 The time cost of goods is particularly evident in this example. If the bidder’s
bid is rejected, he has to search elsewhere for the good—perhaps attend other
auctions.
8 The same skills that have led to his high income may make him a better than
average shopper, of course, but his marginal product is presumably much
greater in the market, since the imputed income from skillful shopping is
modest.
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experiments to be reluctant to do things that would paint them as
bargain hunters.
Reluctance to trade arising from a desire to signal high
opportunity costs of time is difficult to distinguish empirically from
reluctance to trade arising from a desire to signal inelastic demand,
and in fact there is considerable overlap because of the effect of high
time costs on the price elasticity of demand. But there is the
following difference: the first type of reluctance implies a special
reluctance to seek bargains when the ratio of the time required for
the bargain hunting to the potential savings is high, while the
second type (signaling inelastic demand rather than high
opportunity costs of time) implies a special reluctance to bargain over
necessities. A person might be reluctant to acknowledge being
willing to buy a new pair of shoes only if they cost less than $40
while being quick to admit that he would not pay that much for a
silk scarf. It is less embarrassing to admit that one has a relatively
elastic demand for a “frivolous” than for a necessary item. Indeed,
this may signal frugality or sobriety rather than lack of wealth, and
we suggested earlier that such signals are rational in some
circumstances.
Risk Taking. Taking large financial risks is primarily the domain
of the wealthy. The clearest case is that of the exclusive gambling
casino, where the minimum stakes of a bet are so high, and the
potential losses so great, that only the wealthy can afford to play. But
business also provides opportunities for conspicuous risk-taking that
demonstrates willingness to lose huge amounts of money, implying
wealth, provided it is one’s own money that is at risk, not borrowed
money, though the ability to borrow really large sums implies
wealth.
Taking large financial risks is not only a sign of wealth; it is also
a common cause of wealth. Wealthy people are often people who at
some time in the past engaged in ventures with high potential
payoffs to compensate for assuming a high risk of loss. Some of
these successful “gamblers” are merely lucky, but others are able and
most are at least daring, and so an added benefit of being seen
engaging in big gambles is that it is a signal of courage and ability as
well as of wealth.
Gary Becker argues in an unpublished paper (Becker 1999) that
status and income are complements, implying that a desire for
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higher status will induce risk-taking activities, since a higher status
will increase the marginal utility of income. (See also Robson
(1992).) If so, risk taking can be a signal that the risk taker is seeking
to enhance his status. Conversely, aversion to risk taking by a
wealthy person might signal that he has already achieved a very high
status and would not experience a significantly increased marginal
utility of income if his status were to rise even further.
IV. PRIVATELY OPTIMAL SIGNALING
Signaling involves costs as well as benefits, and let us try now to
model the tradeoff. For simplicity we assume only one time period
and a given price level. The individual is assumed to care about just
two things, nonconspicuous spending (C) and status (S), and thus
he tries to maximize U(C,S). “C” primarily refers to consumption
that is made for nonsignaling purposes but it also includes
nonconspicuous investments made for purposes of increasing
nonconspicuous consumption in old age or funding nonconspicuous
bequests whether personal or charitable. Whether status is valued for
its own sake or as an instrument to obtain other benefits in the
future is irrelevant to the model.9 We use status merely as an
illustration of personal characteristics that an individual might wish
to signal.
Status, we further assume, has two components, one that is
beyond the individual’s control and the other that can be influenced
by economic behavior. The fixed component, labeled Sg (“g” as in
“given”) is determined partly by inheritance from a previous
generation, such as inherited wealth, family name, or a noble title,
partly by sex and age, and partly by attributes that at some time in
the past were partly or completely under the individual’s control,
such as educational or professional achievements. This fixed or
endowed component of status consists of beliefs held about the
individual before (or apart from) any efforts that he makes to alter
those beliefs through signaling. The discretionary component of
status, Sv (“v” as in “variable”), can, unlike the fixed component, be
affected by the individual’s current decisions. Sv depends on the
expenditures incurred in signaling (E). (We assume diminishing
                                    
9 We discuss the distinction in Fremling and R. Posner (1999).
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returns.) E includes such things as the cost of conspicuous
consumption (typically only a fraction of the price of the goods and
services consumed, since most of the goods and services will have use
value as well as signaling value) and the cost of “waste” in gift
giving—again, typically some fraction, as most gifts have some use
value and some reciprocal gift giving will usually be anticipated. Our
concern is with the part of E that is incurred in signaling through
the buying and selling process itself. We shall discuss in Part VII the
case of a Mr. R who to signal affluence refuses to sell for $100 a
bottle of wine that he had bought for only $5, even though he never
pays more than $35 for a bottle of wine and so would not be
expected to value this bottle at $100. Suppose the maximum price
that he would have paid for the $5 wine (in the absence of
signaling) was only $7, but, when he was offered $100, signaling
considerations induced him to consume the wine rather than to sell
it. Then his “market signaling expenditures” would be as much as
$93.
With a given real income, the individual decides how much
resources to allocate to nonconspicuous spending, C, and how much
to enhancing status, E. The income constraint is  I = C + E and the
formal model is
(1)  max. U(C,S),   with ¶ U/ ¶ C > 0 , ¶ U/ ¶ S > 0, ¶ 2U/¶ C2 < 0 , 
             ¶ 2U/¶ S2 < 0 ,  ¶ 2U/ ¶ C ¶ S > 0
(2)  S = Sg+Sv(E) ,   with ¶ Sv/ ¶ E > 0, ¶ 2(Sv)/ ¶ E2 < 0
(3)  I = C+E.
The first-order condition for a maximum is
(4)  ¶ U/ ¶ C = ( ¶ U/ ¶ S)( ¶ Sv/ ¶ E).
In words, at the optimal solution, a marginal increase in resources
devoted to nonconspicuous spending increases utility by the same
amount as does a marginal increase in resources spent on status
signaling.
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The exogenous variables are Sg and I. They affect the
individual’s decision on how much to spend on status seeking as
follows:
(5)
dE dSg/ =
+ +
<
-( U/ S )( S / E)
U/ C ( U/ S )( S / E) ( U/ S)( S / E )
2 2 V
2 2 2 2 V 2 2 V 2
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0
An increase in endowed status (Sg) results in a reduction in the
amount of effort devoted to status seeking; in other words, Sg and Sv
are substitutes. This can explain the behavioral difference between
those who already possess an established status position (such as “old
money”) and those who don’t (“nouveau riche”). Even if the
members of the two groups have the same income and the same
taste for status (as represented by the utility function), the nouveau
riche will spend more on status seeking.
As shown in Equation (6), an increase in Sg raises S by a smaller
amount because E and thus Sv are reduced:
(6)  =+= )/)(/(1/
gVg dSdEESdSdS ƒƒ
1 1
1
0 12 2 2 2 2 2 2− + +
> <[ / ( / )( / )]/[( / )( / ) ] ,∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂U C U S S E U S S E but 
Given the budget constraint (Equation (3)) and that
(7)  dC dI
U C U S S EV
/ [ / ]/[( / )( / )]= +
1
1 ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 > 0,  but <  1
       
it follows that
(8)  dE/dI = 1 – dC/dI   > 0 but < 1.
Equations (7) and (8) show that as income increases, both
nonconspicuous spending and spending on status seeking increase.
In other words, as the model is set up, neither is an inferior good.
We have said little about the Sv(E) function itself. It combines
all methods by which the individual can devote resources to
Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics 16
increasing his status; what the particular methods are depend on the
culture and the individual’s place within it. It can be shown that if
the function shifts upward, so that a given expenditure yields more
status, people may expend more or fewer resources on status seeking.
This is just as with ordinary goods: one might spend less, as the
lower price enables one to obtain the same benefits more cheaply, or
more, in order to obtain still greater benefits.
As between two people who differ only in the cost of acquiring
status, we expect the person with the lower cost to acquire more and
thus to have a higher status. If the cost is higher for deceivers (in
other words, if the cost of producing a truthful signal is on average
lower than that of producing a false signal (cf. Milgrom and Roberts
(1986)), then a Pareto optimal equilibrium level of market signaling
may be achieved.
Suppose now that the people who have the highest status in
society do not derive such status from wealth but instead from power
or education. (Alternatively, suppose there are different status
hierarchies, such as wealth, power, and prestige, that are imperfectly
correlated.) This elite would possess a high Sg and therefore choose a
low E. That would make it hard for other people to mimic the elite
by expending economic resources: lavish consumption or gift giving,
or acting as if one didn’t care about the price of goods, might be
perceived as “vulgar”—indeed as proof that one does not belong to
the elite.
In the case of an intellectual elite, the possession of earned
wealth might be taken as a signal that the individual had been
spending too much time on consulting at the expense of research
and other hard-to-monetize university obligations. In a curious
reversal, the Sv function would then be expressed as expending
resources on concealing wealth. At the opposite extreme, for
example during the Gilded Age of late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century America, when the top layer of society was both
wealthy and new (implying that the elite lacked Sg but had a high
I), people wishing to signal membership in the elite would have
every incentive to flaunt their wealth.
One observes that children of wealthy families sometimes go
into distinctly low-paying occupations, such as art history,
architecture, and college admissions. It may seem, contrary to our
model in which endowed and purchased status are substitutes, that
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these individuals are purchasing status by forgoing income. Our
interpretation is different. They are either substituting nonpecuniary
for pecuniary income (much like the substitution of leisure for
income due to declining marginal utility of income), or actually
signaling wealth or high social status by going into low-paying but
prestigious occupations that attract other people from wealthy
families.
The existence of subcultures complicates the picture but is
amenable to our analysis. During the 1960s, there was a wide gap
between the culture of the establishment, in which wealth and
income were major determinants of status, and a rebellious youth
culture composed disproportionately of the scions of upper-middle-
class families. Youngsters who had little family wealth or “name” to
rely on and no great achievements or promise as students were less
likely to rebel, as their self-interest was best served by signaling a
willingness to work hard in conventional occupations. Lower
middle-class people often dress more carefully than the well to do in
order to signal affluence and also conformity to middle-class norms.
In terms of the model, people with little Sg may have an incentive to
compensate with heavy expenditures on Sv.
V. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
Market signaling can create positive or negative externalities.
Consider, first, signaling wealth through exaggerating one’s
inelasticity of demand for a consumer item. It may seem plain that
such signaling creates inefficiency. If someone outbids everyone else
in a public auction simply to signal that he is so wealthy that price is
unimportant, the item is likely to end up in the hands of a person
who does not value the item “itself” the most. But this need not be a
misallocation of resources, since the product is bundled together
with the signaling and there is a value to signaling. The person
choosing this particular means of signaling presumably selected it
because it seemed the most cost-effective means of signaling in the
circumstances, and he is the one ending up footing the higher price,
while the negative externality imposed on the persons who are
outbid is offset by the positive externality conferred on the seller,
who receives more revenue (that is, these are pecuniary externalities).
And unlike the case of conspicuous consumption, no substantial
resources are consumed in the signaling, though the normative
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significance of the distinction is unclear, since there is no obvious
externality when someone destroys his private goods.10 So long as
the signal conveyed by market behavior is positively correlated with
wealth or other characteristics desired in a transacting
partner—which it should be in general, since mimickers incur a
higher cost of engaging in such behavior11—socially worthwhile
information is created. To put this differently, signaling can
facilitate optimal sorting; we gave an example earlier. Signaling
inelastic demand or high transaction costs for consumer goods can
also increase social welfare by reducing rent-seeking in the form of
negotiating over purchases in an effort to obtain the greatest surplus
from the transaction.
The qualifications in the preceding paragraph are important.
When market signaling is used to mislead, or when it consumes
substantial resources merely to achieve a positional advantage, there is
social waste. The second of these concerns is particularly activated by
status signaling, since status is a positional good. If raising your own
status by signaling it more effectively reduces someone else’s, then
your expenditures on raising your status have imposed an external
cost. The external cost need not, however, exceed the benefit to you.
If people who succeed in status competition are on average those
who value a high status the most, then the reallocation of status is
welfare-enhancing. In any event we doubt whether there are any
public measures that would reduce this waste at a cost less than the
benefit, especially since efforts to discourage market signaling might
deflect people to socially more costly methods of signaling the
possession of desired traits.
We have emphasized market signaling in consumer markets but
wealth and altruism can also be signaled in labor markets, for
example by donating one’s time to good works, such as serving on
                                    
10 In fact, there is no social cost if the conspicuous consumption takes the form
of literally burning money, which is a claim on goods rather than a good.
Indeed, by reducing the money supply, burning money increases the wealth of
the rest of the community!
11 The fact that it is often difficult to deceive people has led evolutionary biol-
ogists to suggest that “selection for deception and avoiding being detected may
select for self-deception in the deceiver the better to hide the ongoing deception
from others.” Trivers and Burt (1999), p. 17.
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the board of a hospital or museum or working Sundays in a soup
kitchen. Efforts to reduce this signaling would undermine altruism.
Of course, there is something of a paradox in the concept of
“signaling altruism”; a pure altruist acts purely for the sake of altruism
rather than also to enhance his reputation. But it is common for
people both to be generous and to seek a reputation for being
generous.
Economic theory might be thought to predict that “volunteers”
would work harder if they were offered a small hourly compensation,
but this is wrong; the offer of money would be viewed as an insult,
challenging the motivation behind volunteering. Acceptance of
compensation would not only obscure the signal of altruism but also
raise questions about the sincerity of the volunteer’s support of the
activity for which he had volunteered. Similarly, rules that compel
altruistic behavior, such as the rules that require lawyers to donate
some of their time to “pro bono” activities such as representing the
indigent, can backfire by destroying the signal of altruism. Lawyers
do not get fully credited for being altruists when they engage in such
activities because they may be thought to be doing so as a matter of
duty rather than of choice.
Traditionally, much volunteer work was performed by well-to-
do women. Their undertaking to perform unpaid work signaled that
they had married well enough (or had other sources of unearned
income) not to have to work. To the extent that signaling motives
evoke socially valuable work, it promotes social welfare. Volunteer
work, however, is only a small part of all work performed. For most
workers, a low salary signals not altruism or wealth but merely that
the worker is not very productive. There are exceptions:
monopsonistic labor markets, such as military service (where there is
only one potential employer), in which salaries are artificially
depressed,; and markets in which a large fraction of compensation
takes the form of leisure or other nonpecuniary benefits, such as
teaching and art. But in general a high salary signals ability, and
therefore a worker will strive hard to obtain a high salary not just for
the strictly materialistic benefit but also for the valued personal
characteristics that the salary signals. By the same token, a person
whose wealth or other qualities are strongly signaled otherwise than
by earned income (for example, a person known to have inherited a
huge amount of money) has less incentive to seek a high-paying job
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because the signaling value of holding such a job is less for him than
it would be for other people. As we pointed out earlier, some
occupations, such as architecture and university administration,
traditionally paid little, in part because they were attractive to
wealthy people. But to the extent that a high salary is valued as a
signal, a worker may solicit job offers even if he doesn’t want to leave
his present job and his marginal utility of income is low at his
present wage; in this way, signaling can exacerbate rent-seeking and
thus have a negative effect on overall social welfare.
VI. MISSING MARKETS
Up to now we have largely ignored the case in which a market
activity conveys a signal about the other party to the transaction—for
example that he is needy or dishonest. The possibility of emitting
this kind of negative signal and thereby offending a potential
transaction partner can affect one’s market behavior because it
normally is not in one’s interest to be considered a rude person.
Indeed, if the other person has to “pay a price” in terms of lowered
status for dealing with you, you may have to compensate him by
offering unusually good monetary terms. The “price” can be so high
that people will sometimes refrain from making offers of
transactions that in the absence of signaling considerations would be
mutually beneficial. While according to standard economic thinking
more choices are better, or at least not worse, than fewer ones, once
signaling is brought into the picture it becomes apparent that an
offer sometimes can harm the offeree by signaling a belief that he is
poor, unskilled, desperate, or untrustworthy. An offer of a job that is
“beneath” you could harm your employment prospects by signaling
to the world that the offerer thinks that your prospects are poor.
Analogous considerations may explain why very few people
would consider asking a neighbor or colleague to mow their lawn or
clean their house for money. This reluctance is often discussed under
the rubric of incommensurability—the idea that certain goods
cannot be compared through the medium of money. Supposed
instances of incommensurability can, however, often be explained in
terms of signaling (see E. Posner (1998), pp. 1202–1206). The
request would signal a belief that the neighbor or colleague is so
necessitous, or perhaps so lacking in pride or self-esteem—or so
greedy—that he is willing to do low-status work. In other words,
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the offer conveys a negative signal about the offeree. But context is
all-important. Many adolescents do mow lawns for money and so it
would not be rude to inquire whether a neighborhood kid would do
yardwork. The difference is that few adolescents, even those
possessing considerable status within their cohort, are able to find
part-time, high-paying, prestigious jobs. Even if his parents are
wealthy, the adolescent may be expected to work so as to learn to
shoulder responsibilities, or he may work for pin money to spend on
luxuries that his parents deny him as inconsistent with building
character. Since everyone knows that the adolescent is not a high-
class worker, a proposal that he do yardwork is not a challenge to his
status and therefore is not offensive (and likewise, of course, if the
proposal is to a person known to make his living as a yardworker).
Also different is the case in which you ask your neighbor or
colleague to do something for you as a “favor,” for here the signal is
that he is altruistic, not that he is poor, desperate, or lacking in a
sense of self-worth.
Another example of how activities can emit bad signals when
they are converted to market activities is that suggestions of
consensual sex without any payment are vastly more acceptable than
suggestions of sex for pay. It is not the transfer of resources per se
that is objectionable; it is commonplace to make gifts to a sexual
partner, or for a wife in a traditional marriage to get half the
husband’s salary in implicit exchange for services prominently
including sex. The offensiveness arises from the implications about
the nature of the relationship and the status of the intended
recipient of the money.
The point is applicable to goods as well as services. Suppose that
a friend shows you a coffee mug and remarks that he bought it for
$3 at a certain store. He would be offended if you tried to buy it
from him for $4. For this would suggest either that his time is not
valuable and therefore he is willing to incur the inconvenience of
going and buying another mug (and you are not) or that he is so
hard up that a dollar is important to him. The offense would be
greater if he has made clear that it is a good that he cherishes despite
its small monetary value (a family heirloom, for example) and less if
the opposite is apparent, as in the case of clothes that one’s children
have outgrown. Yard sales are generally of this character—people
selling what they want to get rid of, less to get money than to clear
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space for things they want to buy. Hence it is not a humiliation to
be observed selling consumer goods in the context of a yard
sale—although donating the goods would send a stronger signal of
wealth.
Negotiating over the price of cheap consumer goods is
uncommon in Western cultures (the suburban yard sale being a rare
and, as we have just seen, readily explainable exception). Although
the main reason may simply be high time costs, another reason is
that negotiating creates a situation in which one may have to reveal
the elasticity of one’s demand, with implications about one’s wealth
that may be embarrassing. The existence of a nonnegotiable, “take it
or leave it” price avoids this possibility. By buying at that price the
buyer reveals only that the maximum that he is willing to pay for the
item is equal to or above the set price. Individuals whose maximum
willingness to pay falls below that price need not be embarrassed, as
this maximum is never publicly revealed; such persons are
indistinguishable from those who simply do not like the item.
Sometime the potential for embarrassment is unilateral.
Markets deal with this for example in an auction in which the
potential consumers are identified (and so may reap a benefit in
signaling wealth) but the seller—who may be someone who has
fallen on hard times and wants to sell inherited valuables—is
concealed.
Often it would be offensive to ask somebody else to do a task for
money yet it is not degrading to do it oneself. Generally one is not
embarrassed to be seen working in his own yard. Working in one’s
own yard can have recreational benefits and signal a conscientious
concern with the appearance of one’s property, blurring any signal
that one is doing one’s own yardwork because one can’t afford to
hire someone else to do it. For that matter, there is no
embarrassment in being seen working in the neighbor’s yard if one is
not being paid; one might be working there out of altruism or
because one did not have one’s own garden—for reasons unrelated to
lack of wealth!
We have been discussing what we call “reluctance to suggest
trade” and it is natural to ask whether the root of the problem is the
offer of money as distinct from something else of value. We think
not. If you offered your neighbor a sack of potatoes to mow your
lawn, this offer would be as offensive as its cash equivalent. What
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makes people associate offensive offers to trade with money is that
when the trade involves goods or services on both sides rather than
goods or services on one side and money on the other, the
offensiveness of the signal is often obscured. Swaps of services may
be motivated by a desire to avoid income taxes or to economize (as in
carpooling), or may be a form of socializing, as when mothers swap
babysitting services with each other.
In an interesting experiment, Boza and Diamond (1998) find
that when a friend is selling to a friend, he offers a lower price than
when he is selling the same good to a stranger; but when a friend is
buying from a friend, he does not seek a lower price than when he is
buying from a stranger (p. 561). Our analysis provides a
straightforward explanation. The seller signals generosity to the
friend by offering a discount, anticipating future transactions (one
definition of friendship) and therefore wishing to signal a good
character, while the buyer signals affluence to the friend by not
“angling” for a lower price.
VII. USING SIGNALING THEORY TO INTERPRET THE
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
A debate began about twenty years ago over what appeared to be
a widespread reluctance to trade that seemed inconsistent with the
economist’s normal model of human behavior. The central puzzle
was why “willingness to accept” (that is, the seller’s minimum
demand) seemed often to exceed “willingness to pay” (that is, the
buyer’s maximum offer) for the same item (see Bishop and Heberlein
(1979); Knetsch and Sinden (1984)). An explanation was sought in
the “endowment effect,” implying that the underlying cause of the
disparity was the endowment itself (that is, who possessed the item
in question), thus implicitly downplaying other factors, such as
transactions costs (see Thaler (1980); Kahneman, Knetsch, and
Thaler (1986)). Sometimes the debate was cast in terms of whether
the Coase theorem is valid. The relevant literature is by now huge,
including descriptions of classroom experiments on lottery tickets,
coffee mugs, chocolate bars, and other small items which the
experimental subjects prove curiously reluctant to trade or sell. There
is much more to behavioral economics than reluctance to trade (for a
useful bibliography, see Sunstein (1999)), and so the critique that we
offer of behavioral theories is limited.
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The endowment effect, if it exists, is merely the description of a
phenomenon. The challenge to rational-choice theory comes from
the behavioralist claim that the effect reflects a reluctance to trade
that is due to cognitive problems (for example that people have a
better understanding of out-of-pocket costs than of opportunity
costs), and to “fairness” concerns (that people have a strong sense of
entitlement to what they possess), that are inconsistent with
rationality, or at least with the economist’s normal conception of
rationality. Alternative explanations consistent with rationality have
been proposed (see Hoffman and Spitzer (1993), R. Posner (1998)),
but without relying on signaling. As we have already hinted, we
think that signaling provides an explanation that is thoroughly
consistent with the economist’s normal conception of rationality.
An influential paper by Richard Thaler presents several puzzling
cases including that of Mr. R, who bought a case of good wine in
the late 1950s for about $5 a bottle. “A few years later his wine
merchant offered to buy the wine back for $100 a bottle. He refused,
although he has never paid more than $35 for a bottle of wine”
(Thaler (1980), p. 43). Our explanation is that R wants others to
view him as being well-to-do and (or) having high opportunity costs
of time. Were he a professional wine trader he would be proud to
make a large profit by selling the wine at a high price. But his role is
that of a consumer, who by refusing the high offer of $100 signals
that he can afford to consume the wine even though his opportunity
cost of doing so, $100, is high. He also signals that he is too busy to
be bothered by such a trivial matter as returning a bottle of wine to
the dealer in order to get $100. His unwillingness to pay more than
$35 a bottle does not signal poverty, because not all wealthy people
value wine highly; it might even signal a disdain for hedonistic
consumption.12
Thaler’s second example (still p. 43) is that of “Mr. H [who]
mows his own lawn. His neighbor’s son would mow it for $8. He
wouldn’t mow his neighbor’s same-sized lawn for $20.” We
discussed this type of case earlier; but the third case that Thaler
presents (pp. 43–44) is, at least superficially, very different:
                                    
12 Habit may be an alternative explanation for inertia in responding to new
opportunities. For an interpretation of habitual behavior as rational, see Becker
(1996), ch. 6.
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Two survey questions: (a) Assume you have been exposed to a
disease which if contracted leads to a quick and painless death
within a week. The probability that you have the disease is
0.001. What is the maximum you would be willing to pay for a
cure? (b) Suppose volunteers were needed for research on the
above disease. What is the minimum payment you would
require to volunteer for this program? (You would not be
allowed to purchase the cure.)
According to Thaler, the typical response to (a) is only $200 but to
(b) is $10,000.  No doubt with college students a liquidity effect can
explain part of the discrepancy, but a more interesting possibility is
that being put in a situation (in (b)) of being deliberately exposed to
a disease is degrading, as it resembles experiments on laboratory
animals, prisoners of war, and inmates of prisons and insane
asylums—all “persons” of low status. There is no comparable
connotation to refusing to purchase an expensive cure. So while the
probability of death is the same in (a) and (b), the latter involves an
additional cost, that of emitting a negative signal.
Behavioralists emphasize the importance of “framing”: how a
problem is phrased, they argue, may determine a choice between two
logically identical solutions. So we read at page 52 of Thaler’s article
of a “Mr. A [who] is waiting in line at a movie theater. When he
gets to the ticket window he is told that as the 100,000th customer
of the theater he has just won $100. Mr. B is waiting in line at a
different theater. The man in front of him wins  $1,000 for being
the 1,000,000th customer of the theater. Mr. B wins $150. Would
you rather be Mr. A or Mr. B?” Some people choose to be Mr. A
and one possible interpretation is that $150 looks smaller than $100
when it is being compared to $1,000 although actually of course it is
larger. But there is a possibly offsetting factor once signaling is taken
into account. Mr. A is a winner; Mr. B a loser who received a large
booby prize. Although no accomplishments are involved in this
example, being a winner draws attention to oneself and may create a
reputation of one’s being “lucky.” Consider now a competition of
skill rather than pure luck. The fastest runner will receive more
status from being Number One than from being faster by some
particular number of seconds than the second-best runner. Rank
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order, because it conveys the essential information so efficiently
(which is why many prospective employers would prefer to know a
candidate’s class rank than his grade-point average), can have a value
in itself that a small sum of money cannot equal.
We may seem to be “picking” on a relatively old paper, ignoring
a mass of experimental evidence generated since that yields results
similar to those in his paper. But we are not questioning the
behavior that Thaler predicts and that later experiments (some of
which we will discuss) report; we are offering an alternative
explanation. Signaling is to someone and therefore in experimental
settings, where the reaction of the professor and the other students
to any signaling implicit in the subject’s response could be important,
we predict that the degree of anonymity will affect the outcome.
Most of the WTA>WTP experiments have maintained participant
anonymity only in the sense that the answers that the experimental
subjects give to the questions are not announced. The tradeable
goods in these experiments are usually worth only a few dollars,
while the opinions of the professors and of fellow students are likely
to matter greatly to each of the participants in the experiment
provided complete anonymity is not assured. It is plausible, therefore,
that participants would demonstrate some degree of self-
consciousness in their answers and hence that the answers would be
likely to contain a signaling component. The prospect of future
classroom discussions or informal chats between students after the
experiment can also affect the students’ responses. For example, if
somebody after the experiment claimed in a conversation to have
answered a question in a certain way, but classroom discussions later
revealed that all answers fell in a different range, the lie would
become apparent.
Consider in this regard the experiment reported in Knetsch and
Sinden (1984) on whether WTA exceeded WTP for lottery tickets.
The tickets generally traded for very high prices, much higher than
the expected payoff. A follow-up survey revealed that the students
had been anxious to participate in the lottery because (p. 513 n. 8)
the “social pleasure of participating in the lottery with the group
outweighed the value of the prize.” If social influence has such a
large effect on the value of the stakes, it is plausible that signaling, a
form of social interaction, could also explain much of the seemingly
irrational behavior of the experimental subjects. Bar-Hillel and Neter
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(1996) also comment at length on the possible influence of social
factors (p. 23) and in particular (p. 24) quote a student in one
experiment calling out “Is this ‘Candid Camera’?” and another (in a
study much like the coffee mug one but involving pens instead) “I
feel silly waiting around to exchange one pen for another for just a
shekel, but it seems to be the ‘correct’ thing to do.” It is “silly” to sit
around for a small transaction because usually it signals low
opportunity costs of time.
The best-known experimental study of reluctance to trade is the
one that Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) conducted with
Cornell coffee mugs. According to their interpretation,  transactions
costs were negligible and so only the endowment effect could
explain why those students who were given the mugs at the outset
of the experiment demanded a much higher price (roughly twice as
high) as the others were willing to pay, with the result that there
was very little trading even though the initial distribution of mugs
was random rather than being based on how much the students
valued them. In contrast, there was no reluctance to trade tokens
redeemable in cash. We interpret these results in terms of our earlier
analysis as a case of general reluctance to sell consumer goods in
response to a small increase in price because willingness to sell would
signal an elastic demand and hence that the person is not affluent.
When the items to be traded are tokens rather than consumer
goods, this reluctance disappears because a willingness to transact in
tokens (= currency) does not signal lack of affluence. Another
possible, though we think less plausible, signaling explanation is that
the recipients perceived the mugs as gifts. To turn around and sell a
gift signals disrespect for the donor, as it implies that he was unable
to choose a gift that would please the recipient. There is no similar
effect with a gift of tokens (cash), since of course the recipient of
cash is expected to spend it.
In the experiment reported in Loewenstein and Issacharoff
(1994), whether one received a coffee mug depended on how well
one scored on a test administered at the beginning of the
experiment. When it was the low scorers who received the mugs,
they did not value them any more highly than the high scorers who
did not receive them. But when high scorers received them, they
valued them much more highly than the low-scoring nonreceivers.
Our interpretation is that when received by low scorers the mugs
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were in the nature of booby prizes and this lowered their value
because possession of them conveyed a negative signal; it marked the
possessor as a low scorer.
A different class of experiments goes by the name of “dictator”
and “ultimatum” games and tests for the influence of altruism and
concepts of fairness on the behavior of the experimental subjects;
there is no claim about cognitive defects. In the dictator game the
subjects are instructed to divide a sum with another person, as in “if
you get $10, how would you split it with another subject in a
different classroom?” In the ultimatum game the person deciding on
the split must take the second person into account because the latter
has the power to reject the offer, in which case neither one receives
any money.
In the dictator game a high fraction of the “dictators” give
nontrivial fractions of the stakes and in the ultimatum games the
fractions are even higher. The experimenters explain the difference
by the offerer’s concern that the offeree will reject a highly
unfavorable split because he will consider it “unfair” or “insulting.” A
consistent explanation that preserves rationality in the usual
economic sense is that an individual who gives something
voluntarily, as in the dictator game,13 signals that he is an altruist or
at least that he cares whether others think he is an altruist, while a
small offer in the ultimatum game not only signifies a lack of
altruism (or lack of caring about being thought an altruist) but also is
a challenge to the offeree’s status. As one us put it in an earlier paper,
“Why won’t [the offeree of a penny in the ultimatum game] take
the penny? For the same reason that I would not kiss Professor
Sunstein’s feet for $1,000 even if the offer were in private. The offer
of the penny would signal to the respondent the proposer’s belief
that the respondent holds a low supposal of his own worth, that he
is grateful for scraps, that he accepts being ill-used, that he has no
                                    
13 Another possibility of course is routine or habitual behavior. The dictator
game resembles tipping, see Ruffle (1998), p. 258, a social norm “enforced” by
the dirty looks that a waiter will give a person who fails without cause to leave a
tip within the customary range. Signaling behavior may be habitual and may
thus carry over from “real life” settings in which it is rational to experimental
settings in which it is not. But we do not pursue this point in this paper.
29 Market Signaling of Personal Characteristics
pride, no sense of honor” (R. Posner (1998), p. 1564).14 By
accepting the offer, then, the offeree would be signaling his
agreement with the offerer’s assessment of his character, and this
signal would harm the offeree in future transactions either with the
same offerer or with anyone who learned that the offeree had
accepted a penny offer. Rejecting the offer is therefore perfectly
rational. And knowing this the offerer will fear rejection and will
therefore have an incentive, quite apart from his own signaling
motives, to make a much more generous offer.
The respondent by refusing the ungenerous offer is also
signaling his affluence. The price of signaling pride, self-esteem, or
related personal characteristics by such a refusal is forgoing the
money offered by the offerer. The wealthier the respondent, the
higher his marginal rate of substitution of nonpecuniary for
pecuniary goods.
Even if all the transactions in an ultimatum game are private,
there is nothing to prevent participants from telling other people
about them. That is, whenever anonymity is less than complete,
there is some likelihood that the negative signal conveyed in a
“private” encounter will eventually be publicized. Hoffman, McCabe,
and Smith (1996)15 find that the degree of anonymity indeed affects
the outcome of the dictator game. The more anonymous the game,
the smaller the “dictator’s” gift. In the most anonymous game, more
than 60 percent of the players gave nothing and fewer than 20
percent gave more than $1 (out of a possible $10), while in the least
anonymous game the corresponding figures were 40 percent and 40
percent. These results support the signaling hypothesis, and the
authors offer an explanation similar to ours.16 An accidental finding
that they made bolsters the hypothesis by revealing students
                                    
14 For empirical evidence supporting this interpretation of the ultimatum game,
see Güth and van Damme (1998).
15 The double-blind experiments reported in the 1996 study were earlier de-
scribed in Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith (1994); see also Hoffman,
McCabe, and Smith (1995). For similar results, see Bohnet and Frey (1999a),
(1999b); Eckel and Grossman (1998).
16 In their 1994 article they explain the result in terms of the “social concern
for what others might think, and for being held in high regard by others,”
while in a later article (Hoffman et al. (1998), p. 340) they talk specifically of
“signaling.”
Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics 30
signaling deliberately by disobeying the experimenters’ instructions.
In an experiment in which a high degree of anonymity was
supposed to be guaranteed by requiring each “dictator” to place his
gift in a sealed envelope, many students did not do so and their
choice was not random. “There was a pronounced tendency for
those leaving no money to seal their envelope, and for those leaving
positive amounts of money to not seal their envelopes” (Hoffman et
al. (1996), p. 656). And Bolton and Zwick (1995), mindful of the
argument (which they call the “anonymity hypothesis”) that the
players may be trying to impress the experimenter, find that
anonymity increases the willingness of offerees in the ultimatum
game to accept the offering player’s “ultimatum.”17
VIII. TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS
The fact that alternative explanations are available to account
for the results of some of the behavioral experiments does not prove
that the alternative explanations are sound. In principle, a body of
data can always be explained by an indefinite number of different
theories.18 To discriminate between the alternatives, we need to
devise tests that the alternative theories predict different outcomes
of. This is difficult to do because many of the data are consistent
with both the behavioral and the rational-choice approaches.
Rational-choice theorists have long believed, for example, that
altruism is a common argument in a rational individual’s utility
function. Therefore, especially when the players in the ultimatum or
dictator game are students in the same class, acquainted with each
other and to some extent, at least, friends, or when the prospective
offerees are traditional objects of charity (as in Eckel and Grossman
(1996)), we would expect a degree of altruistic behavior even if none
of the players had, as posited by the behavioralists, a concept of
“fairness.” And we would expect the tendency to be altruistic to be
amplified by the benefits for one’s reputation of appearing to be
                                    
17 To similar effect, see Fong and Bolton (1997).
18 For example, if a set of data can be explained by Theory A, it can also be
explained by Theory A + B, provided that B doesn’t contradict A, and likewise
by Theory A + B +…n, provided there continues to be no internal con-
tradiction.
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generous and trustworthy.19 Camerer and Thaler (1995), p. 216,
claim that “the outcomes of ultimatum, dictatorship and many other
bargaining games have more to do with manners than [with]
altruism” because by turning down small offers the respondents in
the ultimatum game show that they are not altruistic toward the
offerer. We agree that altruism is not the complete explanation for
these outcomes, but not because there is any contradiction between
the behavior of the “dictators” in the dictator game and the behavior
of the respondents in the ultimatum game. Only saints are altruistic
toward people who insult or otherwise mistreat them. Hence we are
not surprised to find that respondents in the ultimatum game do not
turn down stingy offers when they know that the offer is made by a
computer, Camerer and Thaler (1995), p. 215, since there is neither
a revenge motive nor—as we would stress—a signaling motive for
rejecting such an offer. Notice also that the “revenger” who turns
down the small offer in order to keep offerers “honest” is a kind of
altruist; his self-sacrificing behavior contributes to the maintenance
of an efficient social order.
We regard the use of the term “manners” to explain
nonaltruistic outcomes in the ultimatum and dictator games as in
any event misleading. The term connotes an unthinking reflex based
on early training or “culture” and remote from considerations of self-
interest. In our analysis, the behavior that Camerer and Thaler
classify as displaying good manners is explained as rational self-
interested signaling behavior.
Another area of overlap between behavioral theory and rational-
choice theory concerns the costs of information, a secure part of
conventional rational-choice analysis. Although behavioralists tend
to be concerned with the individual’s ability to process information
that is available to him, while rational-choice analysis focuses on the
transfer of information between individuals (and hence on
asymmetric information), processing costs may explain some of the
results of the behavioralists’ experiments without any need to posit
cognitive quirks or irrationalities (Fremling and Lott (1996), (1999)).
Such costs, however, are rarely high enough to be a plausible
explanation for nontrivial behavior in which the individual’s self-
                                    
19 For evidence of this, which further supports our signaling interpretation of
behavioral experiments, see McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith (1998).
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interest is seriously engaged. In cases such as that of Thaler’s Mr. R
and Mr. H, the complexity of the problem does not seem great
enough to explain the behavior; it is difficult to believe, for example,
that Mr. R could not comprehend that selling the bottle of wine
would put $100 in his pocket, and that $100 is greater than $35. In
such cases, signaling theory rather than analysis of processing costs
provides the rational-choice alternative to the behavioral theory.
The competing theories do have some different empirical
implications, however. As just suggested, we, but not the
behavioralists, expect less “generosity” in either the ultimatum or the
dictator game when the players are strangers to each other, since
both altruistic and signaling incentives are diminished by social
distance. In addition, we, but not behavioral analysis, predicts a
systematic and substantial difference between the behavior of firms
and the behavior of individuals. Firms are less likely to try to signal
altruism than individuals are, because the signal would be disbelieved
to a great extent. Firms do make corporate gifts, but these are often
interpreted cynically as forms of advertising or public relations, and
firms’ frequent efforts to depict themselves as “socially responsible”
are also often interpreted as designed to ward off government
regulation. Nevertheless, these are examples of attempts by firms to
signal altruism; we simply do not expect them to be as common as in
the case of individuals. Nor are they as likely to flaunt their wealth as
much as individuals, since a perception of “obscene” profits can
attract government regulation; nor are they concerned with social
status. It would be worthwhile, therefore, to conduct experiments in
which the experimental subjects are instructed to act as agents of
firms rather than as principals in their own right. If our analysis of
market signaling of personal characteristics is correct, the results of
such experiments should differ systematically from those discussed in
this paper.
We predict that people with inherited wealth will make a larger
fraction of their charitable giving anonymously than people of
similar wealth that they have acquired rather than inherited. This
prediction follows directly from our model, in which endowed and
acquired status are substitutes. The person of inherited wealth has
less incentive to signal wealth by making a charitable gift that is
known to have come from him.
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More can be done to test the effect of anonymity on signaling.
The degree to which behavior in an experimental setting is
concealed from the other players and the experimenter can readily be
altered by altering the size and composition of the audience for the
game. We expect the behavior of the players to differ depending on
whether the audience includes persons (such as teachers and fellow
students) with whom the players anticipate future transactions. In
effect, nonanonymity is a condition of signaling; in a situation of
complete anonymity, the source of any signal is unknown and so
there is no incentive to signal.
Age and occupation of players can be varied, too, and these are
relevant variables in our signaling theory because, to take an example
involving age, we expect young adults to engage in signaling more
than older adults. The young have a strong incentive to form
personal and professional ties because they will have a long time
within which to reap the benefits of those ties. Similarly, signaling
should be more important to people who are engaged in jobs
requiring trust, that is, jobs in which the worker’s performance is not
continuously monitored, so that signals of characteristics (such as
having a low discount rate) positively correlated with good
performance are important to the employer. We might expect
students at elite universities to engage in more signaling than
students in vocational high schools; they would avoid playing the
ultimatum or dictator games in a way that suggested they were
rapacious, greedy, or inconsiderate. And if the job is one in which
the worker is acting as an agent of a profit-maximizing firm, we
expect the worker to be less concerned with signaling that he is
altruistic than if he is a principal, since altruism by an agent can be a
signal that he is a disloyal agent. We also expect urban people to
engage in less signaling than rural people, because urban markets
tend to be more impersonal, and as noted earlier, signaling is less
feasible the more impersonal the market.
These observations lead us to suggest the following concrete
experiments:
1. Vary the degree of anonymity in the ultimatum and dictator
games. To maximize variance, conduct some of the games with no
effort to conceal the players’ behavior—and in those totally public
games, quiz the audience on what opinions they formed of the
Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics 34
character of the different players on the basis of their observations of
how the players behaved in the game.20
2. Conduct auctions of items valued by the type of person who
is the experimental subject, but vary the degree to which the auction
is public. We expect that the more public the auction, the fewer the
bidders but the higher the bids.
3. Administer the same dictator or ultimatum game at schools
that differ in the fraction of their students that go on to occupy
positions of trust in the economy, and to people who differ in age,
occupation, and whether urban or rural.
4. Conduct games in which the players are instructed to behave
as agents for profit-maximizing firms rather than as principals or as
private individuals.
5. Conduct surveys to elicit information on the circumstances in
which the respondents would mow a neighbor’s lawn or render
other services to people whom they know well versus to strangers.
                                    
20 We are mindful of the danger pointed out in Loewenstein (1999), p. F30,
that “it is natural for subjects to infer from the elaborate measures taken to
ensure anonymity that they are supposed to behave in a way that they would
not like others to observe.” In other words, ostentatious anonymity may cause
the participants to behave more selfishly than they would in a counterpart real-
world setting.
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